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ABSTRACT 
Liquidity in financial markets is often thought of as the ease to trade an asset. In most financial 
models it is assumed that it is always possible to trade, which implies that liquidity is high and 
constant. The financial crisis of 2007-2009 showed that this assumption does not hold. During 
the financial crisis, the global stock market saw a substantial decline in asset prices and a period 
of high volatility, and periods of extremely tough markets tot trade in. This illustrates the 
importance of liquidity on the effective functioning of the financial markets. On account of the 
theoretical underpinning on market liquidity and  why it is an important source of priced risk for 
assets, in particular for stocks, we apply a cost-based measure of market liquidity, namely the 
bid-ask spread on all Norwegian stocks as well as the market (i.e., OSEBX). One of the most 
popular measures for the bid-ask spread, namely Corwin and Schultz (2012) and a newly derived 
estimator for the bid-ask spread, what we have denoted Alpha, and derived by Leirvik (2015), 
are applied in this thesis with both estimators using observations of daily high and  low prices.  
We find that: (1)  liquidity is a time-varying risk factor, both for the individual stocks listed on 
the Norwegian stock exchange and of the market; (2) the portfolio which comprises of stocks 
with wide bid-ask spread, has on average higher returns than all other portfolios; (3) the least 
liquid portfolio outperforms the most liquid portfolio, an indication of the presence of liquidity 
premium for the Norwegian stocks; (4) the stocks of both large and small firms for the least 
liquid decile outperform the stocks of large and small firms for the most liquid decile 
respectively; (5) the stocks of  large firms outperform the stocks of small firms for both the least 
and most liquid deciles; (6) the average return difference between the least liquid and the most 
liquid stocks are positive every year; (7) the market outperforms the stocks of small firms for 
both the least and most liquid deciles on an annual basis whiles the stocks of large firms for the 
least liquid decile outperform the market on a yearly basis; (8) the volatility of liquidity (i.e 
spread) for the average liquidity of Norwegian stocks is relatively high in comparison to the 
overall market by applying CS estimator as compared to applying Alpha estimator.; (9) the 
return volatility on the least liquid stocks is relatively high in comparison to the most liquid 
stocks by applying both Alpha and CS estimators; (10) the volatility of excess returns and returns 
in general are higher by applying CS estimator than applying Alpha estimator. 
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Over the past decades, there has been a growing interest regarding the factors that affect 
expected stock returns among both academic and practitioner audiences. The basis of some of 
the recent studies on these issues has originated from two of the most important independent 
intellectual traditions. The first is derived from the asset pricing literature which examine 
whether idiosyncratic risk plays a role in expected stock returns while the second originates 
within the financial market microstructure literature which shows how liquidity is related to 
expected returns. Our thesis is related to the second tradition as the literature on asset liquidity 
has received much attention in recent years. 
Liquidity is often separated into two terms: funding liquidity and market liquidity. Funding 
liquidity refers to funds available for traders to carry out their trades. Market liquidity is the ease 
of trading assets in the financial market. Of course, funding liquidity and market liquidity is 
closely tied together, as is highlighted in a paper by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009). In this 
thesis, we focus on market liquidity, and in particular a specific cost-based measure of market 
liquidity, namely the bid-ask spread. Market makers are often called liquidity providers, as they 
take the opposite position to the traders who want to buy or sell an asset. For this role, the 
liquidity provider charges a fee, just as a restaurant sells its food for more than the cost of raw 
materials. This is the bid-ask spread that market makers set, and is an essential component of 
transaction costs faced by liquidity demanders (i.e., the investors) in a financial market. Market 
makers play a key role in price discovery and stabilization.  
Price discovery refers to the process of determining the price of a security through supply and 
demand factors related to the market as well as other factors associated with transactions. Market 
makers facilitate the determination of accurate prices by their own quotes (i.e., bid and ask 
prices) which directly set market prices and indirectly influence public traders‘ reaction in order 
flow. On the other hand, price stabilization has been defined by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) as the execution of transactions that aim at preventing or retarding a drop in 
the market price of a security to facilitate its distribution to the public (offering). The liquidity 
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provided by market makers helps to stabilize price fluctuations in the short run. This lowers the 
risk of adverse price movements for investors who are generally averse to transaction price 
uncertainty.       
Market makers actively buy and sell securities for their own account in response to expected 
fluctuations in security prices in the short-run. Thus, the central role of market makers is to 
initiate and drive the process of setting equilibrium prices within a bid and ask spread as well as 
to react to the response of these prices. In securities markets with quoted bid and ask prices, 
which represent the buying and selling prices respectively, the buy transaction is in normal times 
executed at a higher price relative to the sell transaction, giving rise to a bid-ask spread. Notably, 
the bid and ask prices apply only to limited trade quantities. Market makers therefore provide 
liquidity in the market by standing ready to buy and sell securities at a prevailing market price. If 
an investor wants to buy a security for example, the market makers sell. Similarly, if an investor 
wants to sell a security, the market makers buy. For this service provision, market makers buy at 
a low bid price, Pb, and sell at a high ask price, Pa, so that they are likely to profit in the 
transactions. The bid-ask spread (BAS) represents the margin, which is the difference of the bid 
price and the ask price, BAS = Pa – Pb, and is a measure of market liquidity and of a trading cost. 
Thus, high trading cost is associated to illiquidity. The trading costs depend on the structure of 
the market where the securities are traded.  
Forward-looking investors demand higher future yields on their investments when they 
anticipate a persistent increase in market illiquidity. This causes the required return to increase 
and consequently results in a fall in securities prices. The effect of market liquidity shocks on the 
market prices of securities introduces additional risk to market returns beyond the risk that is 
related to shocks about the expectations of future cash flows. In the presence of market liquidity 
and price shocks, risk-averse investors prefer securities with lower liquidity risk (i.e., securities 
with returns that are not affected by times of low liquidity). Therefore, the higher liquidity risk 
is, the higher the expected return that is demanded as compensation. The extra return demanded 
by investors as reward for holding assets that may not be easily converted into cash is referred to 
as liquidity premium.  
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 1.2 Background of this thesis 
The Global Financial Crisis began to erupt in 2007 when the subprime mortgage crisis unfolded 
in the US and spread rapidly to most financial markets around the globe. The financial crisis was 
associated with severe liquidity shocks in global stock and bond markets.  The global stock 
markets experienced a substantial fall in asset prices and subsequently entered a period of high 
volatility. The financial institutions were in the centre of the crisis, and many major banks and 
financial institutions faced serious liquidity problems. Liquidity problems that for some turned 
into solvency problems, as it did for Lehman Brothers. At the same time governments and 
central banks around the world attempted to coordinate efforts to provide financial rescue. In 
spite of these coordinated efforts, the stock market crash accelerated. The week beginning 
October 2008, experienced  the worst weekly decline in the history of the United States (U.S.). A 
number of the world‘s largest institutions and financial system were almost at the verge of 
collapse. The stock prices of major global banks declined by about 50% on average during the 
fourth quarter of 2008, resulting in a loss of market value of about 640 billion US dollars. As a 
consequence, the world trade and the world‘s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) witnessed a 
decline of about 25% and 6% respectively at an annualized rate.  
Figure 1 shows the TED spread and its components: the three-month London Interbank Offered 
Rate (LIBOR); and U.S. Generic Government 3 Month (USGG3M) yield over the period July 
2006-July 2009. The TED spread which is the margin between its components increased 
significantly during the financial crisis, indicating an increase in perceived credit risk.   
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Figure 1: The figure illustrates the TED spread  and its components during the recent financial crisis 
 
Another example is the May 6
th
 2010 flash crash, which started at 2:32pm and lasted about 36 
minutes. During that short time, stock indices, such as the SandP500 and the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average, collapsed and then rebounded very quickly. The Dow Jones Industrial 
Average had its biggest intraday point drop (from the opening) up to that point, plunging 998.5 
points (about 9%), most of it within minutes, only to recover a large part of the loss. During this 
time, it was very difficult to trade, as investors, many of them so-called algo-traders, underbid 
each other at an exceptional pace. This made it virtually impossible to trade around the last 
traded price, and liquidity dried up to historically low levels (see for example, Easley et al., 
2011a; 2011b)  However, measuring liquidity is not without problems, as the paper by Andersen  
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and  Bondarenko, (2014) shows. Figure 2 illustrates the evolution of the E-mini SandP500 stock 
index futures contract and its probability of informed trading (PIN) as well as confidence. The 
order flow toxicity  is measured as probability of informed traders such as hedge funds to 
adversely select uninformed traders. For example, market makers was at historically high levels 
an hour before the flash crash. This caused market makers to become liquidity demanders rather 
than liquidity providers.  
  
 
Figure 2: The figure illustrates market value in E-mini SandP500 futures and the order flow toxicity 
(expressed by PIN) an hour before the flash clash as well as confidence 
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As a last example, we include the Euro debt crisis that has been taking place since 2009. In these 
recent years, several Eurozone countries were not able to refinance their debt. Due to the 
problems of repaying debt, many European countries were downgraded by credit-rating 
agencies. Trade in the bonds issued by these countries reflected both the increased credit risk and 
liquidity risk, as the investors shied away from these bonds unless there was a significant 
reduction in price. See Figure 3 for an illustration of long-term interest rates in the Euro area 
over the period October 2009-August 2015.  
 
Figure 3: The figure illustrates the long-term interest rates on bonds issued by countries in the Euro area. 
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The recent financial events clearly demonstrate that liquidity can suddenly deteriorate 
dramatically and is not constant, as standard asset pricing studies usually assume. Thus, liquidity 
changes over time for individual securities and for the market at large. It varies for a number of 
reasons. First, it is dependent in part on the transparency of information about the value of a 
security, which changes over time. Second, the number of liquidity providers and their access to 
capital is a key determinant of market liquidity. Less liquidity is provided when liquidity 
providers (for e.g., market makers, trading firms, banks and hedge funds) lose capital and have 
constraints regarding access to securitized funding as evident in 2008. As a consequence, market 
liquidity drops contemporaneously for most securities. Finally, increased uncertainty regarding 
liquidity makes the provision of liquidity more risky and increases the compensation that 
liquidity providers demand (i.e., the trading cost increases).  
 When more investors have the willingness to engage in trading, they tend to provide liquidity to 
each other and attract more traders into the market, which consequently broadens the aggregate 
market liquidity. On the other hand, the unwillingness of a considerable number of investors to 
trade or the withdrawal of more investors from the market causes, at least temporarily, a decline 
in funding liquidity and a subsequent drop in market liquidity. This consequently affects asset 
prices on the entire market. Thus, liquidity can suddenly dry up, an unfavorable condition in a 
market that market makers, traders, and investors want to avoid or guard against. For instance, 
during the recent financial crisis, investors experienced severe decline in liquidity and were 
scared that liquidity would dry up even further.  
Investors are concerned about liquidity because a dramatic decline in liquidity would lead to a 
fall in securities prices and a rise in the required return as evidenced in the recent liquidity crisis. 
This will subsequently contribute to a large drop in securities prices as the crisis worsens. This 
can be a plausible explanation to why prices rebounded so strongly when the liquidity crisis 
eased off, beginning from March 2009. Here, liquidity crisis is referred to as a situation where 
market-wide liquidity suddenly drops as market makers and dealers widen bid-ask spreads, 
refuse to use their phones, or bring their operational activities to a close as they run out of cash at 
their trading houses. It is also related to a state where they take their money off the table and 
securities prices drop dramatically as well as volatility increases.  
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Variations in the overall market liquidity relative to expected value are commonly referred to as 
liquidity shocks. The new level of liquidity affects aggregate securities prices, if these changes 
are persistent. Thus, when the overall market liquidity exacerbates and trading costs rise, these 
costs are more likely to remain higher for a while and, as a consequence, stock prices fall. The 
plausible explanation for this is that,  forward-looking investors demand higher expected returns 
on trade securities as a reward for bearing higher trading costs. In other words, investors discount 
future corporate cash flows at higher rates, which cause stock prices to decline, ceteris paribus, 
see Acharya and Pedersen (2005). 
Market-wide liquidity shocks generate shocks to asset prices and are associated with uncertainty 
about asset returns. These aggregate liquidity shocks are considered as a source of systematic 
risk that should be priced by risk-averse investors. Empirical evidence regarding the notion that 
exposure to liquidity shocks is priced has been presented in literature, see, for e.g., Pastor and 
Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005. However, the connection between market-wide 
liquidity shocks and asset prices differ across securities.    
Liquidity is considered the most critical factor in financial market growth and assessment, thus, 
maintaining market liquidity is necessary for the market to become more stable and help 
accelerate its growth. Moreover, it is multi-dimensional and is characterized by trading 
quantities, trading speed, trading cost and price impact, see Liu, 2004. Liquidity is considered to 
be essential for effective market functioning. In recent years, there has been a growing interest 
regarding the role of liquidity in empirical finance, see Datar et al. (1998); Lesmond et al. 
(1999); Lesmond (2005); and Goyenko et al. (2009). 
Different scholars and researchers concerned with market liquidity have proposed different 
liquidity measures, for example, Roll, 1984; Lesmond et al., 1999; Amihud, 2002; Hasbrouck, 
2004; Holden, 2009; Corwin and Schultz, 2011, to demonstrate the significant role of liquidity in 
asset pricing and to document how liquidity affects assets prices as well as the overall securities 
market performance. However, each existing measure typically focuses on one dimension of 
liquidity, mainly trading costs or price impact. This is due to the fact that the liquidity premium 
compensate for price impact, see Lou and Shu, 2014, and trading costs are among the 
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fundamental characteristics of many investment plans and financial assets, Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986).  
Further, a number of empirical studies have employed several liquidity measures to analyse the 
effect of liquidity on asset pricing and provide a prediction of how liquidity is related to expected 
returns of portfolios across different securities. Amihud and Mendelson developed a model in 
1986 that gave rise a two major predictions. The first prediction is that in equilibrium, the return 
on an asset with higher trading costs is equal to the return that would be earned on a similar risk 
asset with perfect liquidity (involving zero trading costs) plus a return premium that compensate 
investors bearing the higher transaction costs (i.e., higher trading costs result in an asset price 
discount). The second prediction is that the marginal increase in these costs on the returns 
required by investors is lower due to the clientele effect. This happens because in equilibrium, 
investors with longer holding periods tend to hold low-liquidity assets.  
After testing these predictions on the return-trading cost relation using data on stock traded on 
the AMEX and NYSE and the relative bid-ask spread measure of liquidity, their results 
supported the predictions of the theoretical model. However, they concluded that, ―liquidity is 
priced: stocks with a high bid-ask spread have a higher cost of capital or lower price for any 
given cash flow that these stocks generate‖ (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). Several later studies 
(for example, Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996; Datar et al., 1998; Loderer and Roth, 2005) 
confirm the predictions of the theoretical model of liquidity as measured by bid-ask spread (i.e., 
a measure of the trading cost dimension of liquidity) and average portfolio returns. As a result of 
this, market liquidity as measured by the bid-ask spread has gained a lot of attention among 
scholars, researchers and market participants.  
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 has been perceived as the worst financial crisis after the 
great depression of the 1930‘s and illustrates the importance of understanding liquidity and 
liquidity risk and the impact on securities prices and on the functioning of financial markets. 
Because the oil and gas industry is a major part of the Norwegian economy, we will consider the 
current turmoil in the energy markets, in particular the oil market and the effect on market 
liquidity. In light of this, we aim to test the behavior of these two measures for the bid-ask spread 
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before, during and after the financial crisis as well as the current turmoil in oil market and how 
they affect the liquidity of the Norwegian stock market. 
Early studies have proposed liquidity measures based on daily return and volume data as proxies 
for investors‘ liquidity and transaction costs. However, most of these studies (for example, 
Lesmond et al., 1999; Lesmond, 2005; Hasbrouck, 2009) tested whether a relationship exists 
between security returns and these liquidity measures but hardly tested whether the measures 
actually measured transaction costs. Goyenko et al. (2009) argued that the proposed liquidity 
measures which are believed to capture the transaction costs of market participants are rarely 
tested. This is because in the US markets, readily available transaction data are limited and in 
many other markets there are no transaction data at all. In addition, only a few proposed liquidity 
measures have been previously tested and liquidity benchmarks used in the literature are very 
limited. There is therefore no doubt that there are conflicting views about which measure is 
better and there exists little evidence that the proposed measures are related to investor 
experience (Goyenko et al., 2009).   
According to Corwin and Schultz (2011), there is still little research on the potential application 
and analysis of the prominent liquidity measures for the bid-ask spread regarding which 
measure(s) provides the much-needed assurance of liquidity measurement.  Meanwhile, there are 
a few recent innovations for a measure of the bid-ask spread with little consensus on which 
measure is a better measure of liquidity. There is also little evidence that these proposed 
measures of the bid-ask spread actually measure liquidity. That is, whether these measures 
actually capture the transaction costs of market participants (Goyenko et al., 2009). Butler et al. 
(2005) also posed an important: should firms be interested in the market liquidity of their 
securities? It has been established in the literature that liquidity is priced in the cross section of 
stock returns, see Amihud and Mendelson (1986); Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996); Easley et 
al. (2002). Some existing literature tries to answer this question by linking liquidity to a firm‘s 
cost of capital, however, they find no supporting empirical evidence on this issue in the case of 
stocks, (for example, Reingamum, 1990; Eleswarapu and Reingamum, 1993). This therefore 
creates a need for further studies to address this gap in the  literature by relating these proposed 
measures for the bid-ask spread (i.e., liquidity) to portfolio returns and further control for firm 
size to come to a conclusion. Subsequently, it can be fruitful to investigate whether liquidity risk 
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is priced, hence it is also important to analyse how the bid-ask spread affects portfolio returns as 
well as make a comparison with the market index (i.e. OSEBX). 
1.3 Statement of the problem 
As highlighted in section 1.2, liquidity is especially important for investors and plays a crucial 
role in facilitating the effective and efficient functioning of markets. The gap in literature has 
also been discussed in this section. Our main motive for this research is to provide an answer to 
the main research question: How does the bid-ask spread measure of liquidity affect returns? The 
lion‘s share of this thesis will be concerned about this question. However, there are many 
subquestions that can be addressed, such as; Are returns on the least liquid stocks higher than 
that of the most liquid stocks? Does the size of the firm explain any patterns in returns due to 
liquidity?; How does the volatility of returns between the least and most liquid stocks differ?; 
and Is the volatility of liquidity for the average Norwegian stocks relatively high in comparison 
to the OSEBX spreads? These questions are important because there is very limited literature 
available regarding the bid-ask spread of Norwegian stocks during the financial crisis of 2007-
2009. Further, the literature regarding which of the few recent innovations for a measure of the 
bid-ask spread provide a better measure of liquidity is also limited. As the research conducted up 
to date has mostly focused on U.S. and large international markets, our main contribution will be 
to investigate whether how market liquidity affects portfolio returns using data from the 
Norwegian stock market. This has not been done explicitly for the Norwegian market up to this 
date. 
1.4 Objective of this thesis 
The main objective of this thesis is to estimate the bid-ask spread (i.e., liquidity) for Norwegian 
stocks using daily observations of high and low prices. We further assess its implication for 
portfolio returns, sorting stock into deciles of lowest to highest liquidity. Due to the key role of 
capital markets in general, and stock markets in particular, we hypothesize  that liquidity (i.e. 
bid-ask spread) of Norwegian stocks decreased (increased) in the financial crisis of 2007-2009 as 
well as in the current scenario of the oil market. This helps to analyse whether decreased 
liquidity (i.e., high stocks‘ trading cost) was associated to losses suffered during this crisis. In 
addition, this thesis is to address the gap in the literature by providing a comprehensive study of 
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the bid-ask spread measure of liquidity in the Norwegian context. This thesis further seeks to 
compare the few recent innovations for a measure of the bid-ask spread to find out how the least 
liquid stocks perform in comparison to the most liquid stocks and the overall market as well as 
after controlling for firm size. To do this, we construct portfolios based on liquidity, control for 
firm size and assess the performance of the portfolios for each of the measures (i.e., models). 
This is important, as it helps in analysing the implication of the bid-ask spread (i.e., liquidity) for 
stock returns. The dataset applied for this thesis is available from TITLON, a database with 
financial data from Oslo Stock Exchange for all universities and university colleges in Norway. 
It contains detailed daily financial data with fully adjusted prices. The data sample consists of 
daily observations of high-low, opening and closing prices from January 3
rd
, 2000 through 
December 31
st
, 2015.  
1.5 Significance of this thesis 
The analysis of this thesis is expected to have important implications for traders, portfolio and 
risk managers, performance evaluation and academic research. For example, our findings may 
guide investors in balancing expected trading costs against expected returns, when it comes to 
their portfolio selection. Our thesis aim to highlight the significance of securities market 
microstructure in the determination of asset returns and hopefully provide a link between main 
stream research on capital markets and this area.  
In addition, the outcome of this thesis is expected to enrich the researchers‘ and other readers‘ 
knowledge on how liquidity, as measured by bid-ask spread, affects portfolio returns. New 
discoveries are bound to be made since an in-depth research is to be carried out. Finally, this 
thesis is timely and its findings are expected to serve as a basis for further studies. 
1.6 Research questions 
The following research questions help this thesis achieve its desirable objectives: 
1. How does the bid-ask spread measure of liquidity affect returns? 
2. Are returrns on the least liquid stocks higher than that of the most liquid stocks?   
3. Does the size of the firm explain any patterns in returns due to liquidity? 
4. How does the volatility of returns between the least and most liquid stocks differ? 
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5. Is the volatility of liquidity for the average Norwegian stocks relatively high in 
comparison to the OSEBX spreads?  
1.7 CHAPTER ORGANIZATION 
This thesis is organized in five chapters as follows:  
Chapter one: This chapter focuses on the introduction of this thesis. It includes an overview, 
background of this thesis, statement of the problem, objectives of this thesis, significance of this 
thesis, research questions, and chapter organization. 
Chapter two: This chapter deals with a theoretical framework on the topic. It reviews existing 
literature related to the topic. 
Chapter three: This chapter deals with data and methods. It includes descriptive statistics about 
the Norwegian stock market. 
Chapter four: This chapter emphasizes on the discussions and findings. 














2.1 Theoretical framework 
Liquidity, marketability or transaction costs are regarded as key attributes of assets which 
influence investors‘ portfolio decisions (Demsetz, 1968). Thus, liquidity and the risk associated 
with potential illiquidity are essential factors for many investors in their investment decisions. 
Liquidity has been described as a time-varying risk factor (for example, Chordia et al., 2000; 
Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001) arising from the difficulty in trading securities quickly enough to 
avoid or minimize a loss. This situation arises due to the lack of relative ease at which securities 
in the market can be traded. Trading problem of a security can also arise due to the volatility 
(which is a feature of liquidity) of the security. This has made liquidity and liquidity risk popular 
topics among scholars and researchers (see, for example, Diamond, 1991; Diamond and Rajan, 
1999; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Cornett et al., 2011) to find some new aspects about 
liquidity.  
Liquidity is regarded as a key concept in financial markets. It is often described as an elusive 
concept (Amihud, 2002). Generally, the concept of liquidity usually denotes a desirable feature 
of a well-organized financial market. A market is considered liquid when the prevailing structure 
of transactions provides a prompt and secure link between the demand and supply of assets, 
hence, the ability to buy and sell assets quickly at low cost (Gabrielsen et al., 2011). 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) have classified liquidity into two forms: market liquidity and 
funding liquidity. To them, market liquidity is concerned with the ease with which a security can 
be traded. For example, a security is regarded as liquid if its trading cost is low, which is an 
indication of low bid-ask spread and a small market impact. On the other hand, funding liquidity 
relates to the ease with which borrowers (individual traders or institutions) can obtain funding. 
For instance, a security is deemed to have a good funding if it is easy to obtain funding using the 
security as collateral.  
It has been established that market liquidity and funding liquidity interact to create what is 
commonly referred to as liquidity spirals (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). This means that, 
when traders such as market makers, dealers and other liquidity-providing traders have good 
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funding (i.e. easy access to available funding), then market liquidity is high. As a consequence, 
customers experience lower trading costs. Similarly, market liquidity improves funding: 
favorable market liquidity and lower volatility provide traders with easy access to funding, thus, 
lowering their margin requirement. During a downturn, this two-way interaction works in reverse 
but with a more severe impact. Generally, liquidity is not constant, but changes over time for 
individual securities and for the market as a whole. Market liquidity can suddenly deteriorate 
dramatically in the wake of volatility increases, sharply security price drop, halt operations as 
trading houses run out of cash or widen bid-ask spread by market makers (as evident during the 
financial crisis of 2007-2009). 
 Market liquidity is also important because it affects traders‘ ability to trade a lot and better in 
terms of being able to accommodate customers‘ demands to sell or buy securities. This has made 
market liquidity risk a popular subject of debate among users of financial liquidity. However, 
this thesis focuses on market liquidity with specific reference to the bid-ask spread as a measure 
of liquidity. The variability and uncertainty of market liquidity is the main challenge facing users 
of financial liquidity such as market makers, dealers, central bankers and investors among others 
(Persaud, 2003). Thus, there is a high tendency for liquidity providers to demand high reward as 
uncertainty of market liquidity increases. This makes the provision of liquidity very risky and 
causes the cost of trading to rise. It has been shown in the work of Amihud and Mendelson 
(1980) that, when the short and long positions that market makers can assume become 
constrained, the bid-ask spread that they charge increases.  
According to Spulber (1996), market microstructure is concerned with this thesis of the 
institutions of exchange and intermediation. Market microstructure literature is related to how 
the actual transaction process affects the determinants of transaction costs, prices, quotes, 
volume and trading behavior, thus plays an essential role in the pricing of securities. A key 
insight into the composition and significance of transaction costs has been provided by the 
studies of market microstructure and the transaction process (Naes and Skjeltorp, 2006). Market 
microstructure has a broader scope and interest, with implications for asset pricing. The main 
idea in the theory of market microstructure is that security prices need not possess equal full-
information expectations of value due to market frictions. Theories of asset pricing normally 
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assumes highly liquid markets, which provide the opportunity for securities to be exchanged at 
no transaction cost at any time the investor want.  
Intermediaries like market makers smooth the pattern of exchange in securities markets. They 
achieve this by creating market liquidity through inventory holding. Demsetz (1968) has shown 
that the ask-bid spread is the markup that is paid for the provision of immediacy of exchange in 
organized markets. Thus, an investor who seeks an immediate purchase or sale of securities 
would buy or sell at the best available price, the bid price or ask price respectively. The 
difference between what a buyer wants to pay (the bid price) and what a seller wants to accept 
(the ask price) is the bid-ask spread. For effective market functioning, providers of liquidity and 
immediacy or market makers quote bid-ask prices and demanders of immediacy - investors (i.e., 
individual and institutional investors like endowment funds, mutual funds, insurance companies 
etc.) place limit orders. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission refers to a ―market 
maker‖ as a firm that stands ready to buy and sell securities on a regular and continuous basis at 
a publicly quoted price, thus, creating liquidity in the market. For instance, the National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) is one of the prime market 
makers. 
In an efficient financial market, securities prices always fully reflect available information. Thus, 
the market price always equals the fundamental value and as soon as new information comes out, 
prices immediately react to fully reflect the new information.  Investors would not be able to earn 
excess return over the market return (i.e., investors cannot outperform the market) if markets are 
fully efficient. However, the market price can differ from the fundamental value and the 
discrepancy between the two values has two possible interpretations: first, it shows a trading 
opportunity, where an investor buys (sells) a security if the market price is less (more) relative to 
the theoretical value; and second, it can reflect that the fundamental value is not correct. In case 
such trading opportunities arise repeatedly, then they give rise to a trading strategy. Trading 
strategies employed by sophisticated investors such as hedge funds do sometimes succeed in 
exploiting such opportunities in the market. Although prices are kept in check by intense 
competition among money managers, prices may also differ from their fundamental values due 
to demand pressures and institutional frictions. This causes the market to become inefficient to 
an efficient extent, that is, inefficient enough to make money managers demand compensation 
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for their costs and risks through superior performance and efficient enough that the 
compensations after transaction costs discourage the entry of new money managers or additional 
capital. Securities‘ returns net of transaction costs, liquidity risk and funding costs are not far 
from their fully efficient levels, making it extremely difficult to outperform the market in a 
consistent manner. Prices can deviate substantially from the present value of future cash flows 
despite the fact that, returns are nearly efficient. Thus, in an efficient market, the fundamental 
value of securities fluctuates randomly. 
Over the past few years, the bid-ask spread has received growing attention among traders, 
regulators, scholars and researchers. The bid-ask spread is regarded as a useful measure of 
trading costs and a better proxy for market liquidity (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Huang and 
Stoll, 1997; Corwin and Schultz, 2012; Mancini et al., 2013). The size of the bid-ask spread is an 
indication of the ease with which one can trade a security and the trading costs associated with 
that security. If spread is zero, then it is frictionless asset and a security with a small spread is 
associated with higher liquidity. Thus, securities with a tight bid-ask spread is more liquid 
relative to securities with wide bid-ask spread.   
The bid-ask spread measure of liquidity has been widely explored in the available literature on 
liquidity (Corwin and Schultz, 2012). Many models of the spread have focused on three main 
factors in determining the cost components of the quoted spread: adverse selection costs (for 
example, Bagehot, 1971; Copeland and Galai, 1983; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985); inventory 
holding costs (for instance, Demsetz, 1968; Amihud and Mendelson, 1980; Ho and Stoll, 1983); 
and order-processing costs (Tinic, 1972; Brock and Kleidon, 1992). Investors expect financial 
assets to be liquid, thus, easily traded in large amount without losing their value. These assets are 
to be characterized by low trading cost, easy trading and timely settlement as well as large trades 
having a limited price impact.  
Statistical models used in available literature to measure the bid-ask spread can be separated into 
two: models developed on the basis of the serial covariance properties of the observed 
transaction prices (see, e.g., Roll 1984; Huang and Stoll, 1994); and those which are based on a 
trade initiation predictor variable (for example, Glosten and Harris, 1988; Madhavan and Smidt, 
1991). Several studies have applied these statistical models in different contexts such as to 
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examine adverse selection costs (Neal and Wheatley, 1995), to explore the dealer and auction 
markets (Porter and Weaver, 1996) and to assess the sources of short-term return reversal 
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1995) as well as of spread fluctuations (Madhavan et al., 1997).  
Asymmetric information plays a significant role in financial markets during crisis period (for 
example, Gorton, 2008) and financial markets are believed to be illiquid when securities become 
information-sensitive (Gorton and Metrick, 2009). Bolton et al., (2008) provides a theory of 
liquidity provision with information asymmetry. They included three sets of agents: investors 
with a short horizon; investors with a long horizon; and financial intermediaries with a long 
horizon and argued that the main source of inefficiency is information asymmetry about asset 
values between intermediaries and long horizon investors. In this case, long horizon investors are 
unable to differentiate an asset sale to get rid of low quality securities from an asset sale that is 
due to a liquidity need. On the hand, informed investors would sell a security at the bid price 
only if available information justifies a lower price. Similarly, informed investors would buy a 
security at the ask price only if available information justifies a higher price. As a consequence, 
trading may result in loss in case of informed counterparty. This asymmetric information leads to 
an adverse selection problem (i.e. an informed investor is more likely to buy or sell when he has 
good news or bad news respectively) and consequently to a price discount. 
The fundamental problem intermediaries face if they are hit by a liquidity shock is whether to 
sell their assets now at a discount or to hold them and ride out the crisis at the risk having to sell 
at a greater discount if crisis persist than expected. Bolton et al., (2008) assumed intermediaries 
learn more about the assets they hold over time. They revealed that, there exist two kinds of 
rational expectations equilibrium: the immediate trading equilibrium (i.e. where intermediaries 
sell securities immediately to ensure they have enough liquidity and the delayed trading 
equilibrium (i.e. where intermediaries hold their assets to ride out the crisis and only sell if they 
have an urgent need to). They further showed that the delayed trading equilibrium is Pareto 
superior when both are present. Their argument was based on the fact that long horizon investors 
undervalue cash while short horizon investors undervalue long-run assets. In this way, 
intermediaries have an incentive to induce long horizon investors to hold more cash and short 
horizon investors to hold more long-run assets in order to make some gains. This is what the 
delayed trading equilibrium can do and the worse the asymmetric information problem gets, the 
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less the gain that can be made. This is because it impedes the operations of the market for the 
long-run assets. 
According to Kyle (1985), the degree of liquidity of the market is based on three aspects: 
tightness; depth; and resilience. The tightness is measured with the bid-ask spread of assets, 
which is a direct measure of trading cost, excluding operational costs. The depth of the market is 
measured with the size of transaction required to alter the price of assets whiles the market 
resilience is the speed with which prices tend to return to their equilibrium after a market shock 
has been experienced. It has been established in literature that the depth and resilience aspects of 
market liquidity are difficult to measure due to the fact that, their measurement requires detailed 
information on every single transaction in the market which may not be readily available.  
Similarly, Sarr and Lybek (2002) combined the market characteristics during periods of stress 
and liquidity risk from the market participant‘s perspective to come up two additional aspects 
along with those stated by Kyle (1985). They identified breadth and immediacy as the two 
additional characteristics of market liquidity. They used Kyle‘s definition of depth for the 
characteristic breadth and described it as the existence of abundant orders, with either actual or 
easily presence of prospective seller and buyers, both below and above the price at which an 
asset trades. They also described immediacy as the speed with which orders can be executed, 
reflecting efficiency of trading, clearing and settlement (Santoso et al., 2010).   
A number studies have investigated the relation of liquidity risk to expected returns (for 
example, Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996; Datar et al., 1998). 
These empirical studies have used a variety of liquidity measures to find that less liquid stocks 
are associated with higher average returns. Amihud has documented evidence of a time-series 
relation of market liquidity and expected returns. The findings of an empirical study conducted 
by Chordia et al., (2000) show a significant cross-sectional relation between the variability of 
liquidity and stock returns, where liquidity was measured using trading activity such as turnover 
and volume as proxies. However, an unexpected result was discovered in their study, which 
measured liquidity risk as firm-specific variability in liquidity. They reported that the more 
volatile a stock‘s liquidity is, the lower its expected returns.  
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Several empirical studies (e.g. Amihud, 2002; Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and 
Pedersen, 2005; Liu, 2006) support a liquidity premium and show that liquidity premium is a 
rational compensation for increased opportunity cost (Grossman and Miller, 1987), risk of flight-
to-liquidity (Acharya and Pedersen, 2005) and higher risks of bankruptcy in recessions – due to 
funding liquidity risk (Liu, 2006). Amihud (2002) documented an interesting experiment 
performed by Amihud and Lauterbach regarding changes in stock returns resulting from 
movement from an illiquid market to a liquid market. They found that the change in liquidity 
was associated with a premium of 5.5%. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) introduced a liquidity 
augmented CAPM, adjusted for both market-wide liquidity and asset liquidity. The authors 
found evidence pointing towards an annual liquidity risk premium of 3.5%, which they explain 
as a response to a strong positive correlation between market return and illiquidity costs.  
The paper by Liu (2006) based on the new liquidity measure over a sample period from 1963 to 
2003 shows that liquidity affects the risk of holding illiquid assets because they underperform in 
recessions (liquidity risk). The empirical evidence in the Liu (2006) paper shows that a 
significant liquidity exists based on non-traded and traded liquidity factors, which is an 
indication that liquidity risk is priced and important for asset pricing. Liu (2006) found that the 
relative bid-ask spread increases monotonically from most liquid portfolio to least liquid 
portfolio and consistent with the high correlation between the new liquidity measure and bid-ask 
spread. The high negative correlation (i.e. -0.649) between the liquidity factor and the market 
factor illustrates the state nature of liquidity: when the market is in downturn states then it is less 
liquid and investors demand higher returns to compensate them for the higher risk they bear in 
less liquid states.   
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) show theoretically that the level of liquidity of financial assets 
affects their returns, a prediction that has been supported by evidence present in a number of 
empirical studies (for example, Amihud and Mendelson, 1989; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 
1996; Amihud, 2002). Other studies also document that liquidity covaries cross-sectionally with 
stocks (see, e.g., Chordia et al., 2000; Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001). Both the demand-side and 
supply-side can be the source of this commonality in liquidity. While some studies (for example, 
Coughenor and Saad, 2004; Comerton-Forde et al., 2008) show evidence of support for supply-
side sources, other studies (for example, Brockman and Chung, 2002; Bauer, 2004) argued that, 
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all the commonality in liquidity cannot be explained by the supply-side sources suggested in 
Coughenor and Saad (2004) for instance.  
Many studies (like Chordia et al., 2000; Karolyi et al., 2008) have documented the existence of 
commonality in liquidity in the U.S. market and in other major international markets. Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005) have highlighted the essence of 
commonality in liquidity for asset pricing in their theoretical work that found evidence of 
commonality as a priced risk factor. Other studies have found support for the empirical evidence 
on commonality as a priced risk factor (see, for e.g., Sadka, 2006; Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008). 
Existing literature that attempt to explain the commonality in liquidity has mainly focused on the 
supply-side sources suggested in Coughenor and Saad (2004). Their proposition was that the 
commonality could arise from the NYSE specialist providing liquidity for various stocks. The 
findings of their study revealed that stocks with the same specialist have commonality in 
liquidity, which is consistent with the evidence present in a similar empirical study conducted by 
Comerton-Forde et al., (2008). Though several papers conclude that liquidity is a priced risk 
factor, Zhang and Yang (2014) finds that the bid-ask spread estimator derived by Corwin and 
Schultz does not provide a liquidity premium. This problem may be due to a technical issue with 
the Corwin-Schultz estimator, as it is sensitive to overnight price changes in prices. We aim to 
conduct a similar analysis on the Norwegian market, with well-known fixes for the Corwin-
Schultz estimator.  
2.2 The bid-ask spread 
Glosten (1987) model the bid-ask spread by decomposing it into two parts: the first part is due to 
asymmetric information and the other part is due to other factors such as monopoly power. The 
author assumes that at any point in time all investors with only common-knowledge information 
(i.e., an investor without inside information) agree on the true price (p). 
The bid price, Pb is given by:  
   Pb = p – Zb - Cb              (1) 
The ask price, Pa is as follows: 
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   Pa = p + Za + Ca               (2)  
The two parts of the adverse-selection of the spread, Za and Zb represent the magnitude of the 
adjustments in the true price, p in response to an investor purchase at the ask price and a sale at 
the bid price respectively. Thus, p represents the (common-knowledge) true price prior to a 
transaction. The gross profit components, Ca and Cb are the exogenously given levels of gross 
profit for a purchase and a sale respectively. The spread can be separated into two parts: the first 
part is the adverse-selection component which is due to the believe presence of informed traders 
and the other part is the gross profit component which represents an addition to cover the 
transaction costs and inventory costs of market maker as well as a normal rate of return to being 
a market maker.  
The adverse-selection component: Za + Zb 
The gross profit component: Ca + Cb 
The bid-ask spread, A – B = (Za + Zb) + (Ca + Ca) 
Glosten (1987) shows that the part of spread due to asymmetric information (adverse-selection) 
could be the source of the downward bias in spread estimate.   
2.2.1 Roll (1984) estimator 
Roll (1984) develops an estimator based on the serial covariance of the change in price. The 
author takes into account the unobservable fundamental value of the stock on day t and the 
mean-zero, serially uncorrelated public information shock on day t as well as the last observed 
trade price on day t in deriving the estimator. An important shortcoming of this estimator is that 
when the sample serial covariance is positive, then the effective spread is undefined.  
2.2.2 Gibbs 
Hasbrouck (2004) introduces a Gibbs sampler estimation of the Roll model using prices from all 
days. The author assumes that the public information shock et in the Roll estimator is normally 
distributed with mean of zero and variance of σe
2
. The author denotes the half spread in the Roll 
estimator as . 
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The author uses the Gibbs sampler to numerically estimate the model parameters {C, σe
2
}, the 
latent buy, sell or no trade indicates Q = {Q1, Q2, Q3,.........., QT}, and the latent efficient prices,  
V = { V1, V2, V3,.........., VT}, where T is the number of days in the time interval. 
2.2.3 LOT  
Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) develop an estimator of the effective spread based on the 
assumption of informed trading on non-zero-return days and absence of the informed trading on 
zero-return days. The LOT model is simply the difference between the percent buying and 
selling costs. A standard ―market model‖ relationship holds on non-zero-return days, but a flat 
horizontal segment applies on zero-return days. The authors assume that the unobserved true 
return of a stock (Rj) on day t is related to the sensitivity of the stock to the market return on day 
t as well as a public information shock on day t, which is normally distributed with mean of zero 
and variance of σj
2
.  
2.2.4 Corwin And Schultz (2012) Estimator 
Corwin and Schultz (2012) estimator (i.e., referred to in this thesis as the CS estimator) is based 
on daily high and low prices. The reason behind is that the high prices are always buyer-initiated 
trades and low are seller-initiated and the ratio of high-to-low prices for a day reflects the 
volatility of the stock(stock‘s variance) and the bid-ask spread of the stock. Variance component 
of the high-to-low ratio is proportional to the return interval while the spread internal stays 
relatively constant for the shorter time span. The sum of the daily price ranges for the two 
consecutive single days reflects the volatility of two days and twice the bid-ask spread, while the 
price range for two consecutive days reflects the volatility of two days but one bid-ask spread. 
On the basis of the insight above, Corwin and Schultz (2012), developed the estimator as 
follows: 
Let β be the expectation of the sum of the price ranges for two consecutive single days. 
                                                                                    (3) 
Where, 




Now, let γ be the maximum range of the high-to-low ratio for the two day period. This can be 
expressed as follow: 
                                                             (4) 
The measure is not forward looking as it can be seen from (t, t-1) in prices as Ht,t-1 (Lt,t-1) is 
maximum (minimum) for the two-day period consisting of days t and t-1. Subsequent to the 
estimated β and γ from stock return data, a proportional difference between βt and γt given in 
equations (3) and (4) to derive the difference as follows: 
                                            (5) 
The first term in equation (5) with βt and γt is equivalent to that given as Corwin and Schultz 
(2012), referred to as CS estimator in this thesis and can be further simplified to the last term. 
The alpha at t will have substantial time variation because it is computed from observed values 
and specifically, observed high and low prices. There is a possibility for apha at t to be negative 
as y at t might be larger in value relative to beta at t. This is a limitation of the model for measure 
of the bid-ask spread. Taking into account overnight trading may reduce the possibility of 
negative values for alpha at t. The negative values of the bid-ask spread is another limitation of 
this model. 
From equation (5), the bid-ask spread is given as follows: 
                                                                                   (6) 
The estimate of the spread, S and alpha will approximately be equal for small spreads. As the 
high-low estimators are easy to compute, making it preferable for large samples as compared to 
other estimators which are difficult to compute such as Gibbs estimator and LOT estimator. 
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2.2.5 Leirvik (2015) Estimator: 
A newly derived estimator for the bid-ask spread, what we have denoted Alpha, and derived by 
Leirvik (2015) is also used in this thesis. The estimator  is based on daily high and low prices. To 
start with, daily high prices are almost always initiated by buyers and daily low prices are 
initiated by sellers. This implies that  ratio of high to low prices for a day reflects the bid-ask 
spread of the stock as well as the volatility associated with that particular stock. Secondly, as 
volatility is proportional to the trading interval, the high-to-low price ratio increase shows the 
increase in volatility. Thus, the sum of the price ranges over two consecutive single days reflects 
two days volatility and double the spread, while the one two-day period price range reflects two 
days volatility and one spread.  
The author assumes that there is a spread between the actual price and observed price which is 
equal to L/2%. The actual price is denoted by a capital ―A‖ superscript. Notice the following: 
Highest actual price of the security during time ―t‖  
Lowest actual price of the security during time ―t”  
Highest observed price during day ―t”  
Lowest observed price during day ―t”  
The author again assumed that the daily high price is a buyer-initiated trade and is thus, grossed 
up by half the spread, whereas the daily low price is a seller-initiated trade and is therefore 
discounted by one and a half of the spread. 
The log-range between high and low prices (following Corwin and Schultz) are given by; 
                                                              (7)                                                                        
The bid-ask spread can be computed from equation (7) which shows the relationship between 
daily high and low prices. 
The logarithm of the observed high and low prices is as follows: 
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                                                              (8)                                                        
Alpha (αt) is also defined as: 
                                                                              (9)                                                              
By taking the expectation of equation (7) and solve for alpha, resultant expression is given as: 
                                                            (10)                         
As Y contains the actual prices so it is necessary to derive expressions with expectation to present 
alpha in terms of observed prices which contains the observed prices. Let γt be the log-range of 
the maximum high and minimum low prices of two consecutive days then the expression will be: 
                                                                (11)                                                 
Equation (11) can be rewritten in terms of Y, αt and the log-range between maximum and 




                                                                                  (12)                                                                
By taking the conditional expectation: 
                    (13) 
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And by solving this expression; 
                                                                   (14)                                         
So by solving and through all these expressions, alpha can be written as: 
                                          (15)        
                                                                                       (16) 
                                                        (17)                              
As log-range of observed high and low price is approximately normally distributed (see Alizadeh 
et al., 2002) so the variance represents the variance over two consecutive days of the log-range 
which implies that Y is also normally distributed. 
The second moment will therefore be: 
           (18) 
The expression derived for sample variance is  
          (19) 
So the final expression for alpha is given by: 
                                                                    (20)           
From equation (20), it is clear that the estimator will produce a real number as long as the 
variance is greater than  and in case  occurs, the 
resultant number will be negative. 
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2.2.6 Bid-Ask Estimators Used in this thesis: 
For the purpose of this study, we rely on one of the most popular measures for the bid-ask 
spread, namely Corwin and Schultz (2012) estimator and a newly derived bid-ask spread 
estimator, namely Leirvik (2015). The Corwin and Schultz (2012) estimator is one of the most 
widely used measures for the bid-ask spread. Both Corwin and Schultz (2012) and Leirvik 
(2015) estimators are simple to compute as they require only daily high and low prices. At the 
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CHAPTER THREE 
DATA AND METHODS 
3.1 Data and methods 
This section presents the data source and dataset used in the analysis. The dataset is obtained 
from the TITLON database. The sample we applied from the dataset consisted of daily 





 2015. Our analysis used a survivor-bias free panel dataset from the Norwegian 
Stock Exchange. Additionally, we applied the bid-ask spread estimators derived by Corwin and 
Schultz (2012) and Leirvik (2015) as proxies for the Norwegian stocks. The portfolio 
construction follows a standard approach where at the beginning of each day t, all common 
stocks are first sorted into deciles for market capitalization. We formulated portfolios ranging 
from companies with small market capitalization in group 1 to companies with large market 
capitalization in group 5. Each market capitalization portfolio is further sorted into deciles for 
liquidity on the basis of the size of the bid-ask spread. Stock returns are then computed for each 
group of liquidity and controlled for firm size. We also provided descriptive statistics about the 
Norwegian stock market in Table 1 and summary statistics for the liquidity sorted portfolios used 
in this thesis in Table 2.  
Tables 1-2 present mean, standard deviation (i.e., std. dev.), minimum and maximum in percent 
and maximum two decmals. As Table 1 shows, there exists a clear difference in statistics for the 
dataset. The difference in descriptive statistics resulting from these proxies is likely to affect the 
measurement of liquidity and variation of portfolio returns analyses between variables. As shown 
in Table 1, the skewness is negative for spreads computed by the CS estimator. This means that 
the CS estimator yielded left skewed distributions of variables with extreme values to the left of 
their means; see the values of mean and minimum in Panel B of Table 1. In contrast, the Alpha 
estimator yielded right skewed distributions with extreme values to the right of their means; see 
the values of mean and maximum in Panel A of Table 1. The skewness is relatively high for the 
average liquidity of Norwegian stocks in comparison to the OSEBX spreads by applying both 
estimators (i.e., relatively high positive and negative values for Alpa and CS estimators 
respectively). In addition, the kurtosis is relatively high for the average liquidity of Norwegian 
 30 | P a g e  
 
stocks in comparison to the OSEBX spreads by applying both estimators. This implies a higher 
probability for extreme values. Moreover, the mean return is higher for lowest liquid stocks as 
compared to that of highest liquid stocks by applying both estimators (see Table 2). As expected, 
higher risk comes with higher returns.   
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the Norwegian stocks and the market (i.e., OSEBX) 
Variables     Mean         Std. Dev.       Minimum   Maximum  Skewness  Kurtosis 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for Norwegian stocks and OSEBX by applying Alpha estimator 
Average Liquidity 
of Norwegian stocks     0.77            2.14              -71.82         201.49          9.23       382.74 
OSEBX spreads     0.44            0.38     -1.10             5.92       3.80          31.64 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for Norwegian stocks and OSEBX by applying CS estimator 
Average Liquidity 
of Norwegian stocks   -1.00            5.82         -1088.45           69.31          -24.51     2828.21 
OSEBX spreads            -0.24            1.30             -13.47             7.01        -1.28         10.81 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics for liquidity sorted portfolios  
Liquidity group Mean return Std Dev. Minimum Maximum Obs. 
Sample period January 2000 – January 2011 
Panel A: Summary statistics for liquidity groups by applying Alpha estimator 
 Lowest    0.05   5.69    -354.54   153.02 171,303 
   2    -0.03              4.58    -180.40   301.48 164,831 
   3    -0.07 0           4.83    -186.60   436.31  160,223 
  4    -0.03              5.43    -252.82   229.45 158,153 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Liquidity group Mean return Std Dev. Minimum Maximum Obs. 
        Highest     -0.09    4.50   -223.14   414.62 268,175 
 Lowest – Highest     0.03    0.08       -0.23        0.25 934,730 
Panel B: Summary statistics for liquidity groups by applying CS estimator 
 Lowest    0.24              6.91               -249.67    436.31 171,295 
   2    -0.06   3.78      -252.82      91.63 164,839  
   3    -0.13   4.37    -354.54      94.61 160,223 
   4   -0.14   4.88    -180.40    190.95 158,153 
           Highest   -0.08   4.51    -227.53    414.62 268,175 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
DISCUSSIONS AND ANALYSES 
4.1 Overview 
This section presents and discusses findings from data analyses in chapter in more depth. To 
facilitate understanding, this section is divided into two parts. The first part discusses the 
presence of liquidity premium for all Norwegian stocks based on liquidity sorted portfolios and 
also after controlling for firm size over the sample period from January 2000 to January 2011. 
The second part of this section compares the performance of the extreme portfolios  and of the 
market in terms of risk and returns. Tables 3-7 present all results in percent and maximum two 
decimals. 
4.1.1 The presence of liquidity premium 
The presence of liquidity premium was checked by sorting all stocks into portfolios based on the 
two estimators applied in this thesis. Thus, if the least liquid portfolio consistently outperforms 
the most liquid portfolio, then, it is evidence of the presence of a liquidity premium. As Table 3 
(Panels A and B) shows, the mean return on an annual basis of the least liquid portfolio 
outperforms the most liquid portfolio, even though there are three years where stocks with a low 
bid-ask spread outperform stocks with a high bid-ask spread. Table 3 clearly indicates that, the 
mean return of the least liquid portfolio is relatively higher than the mean return of the most 
liquid portfolio. The results from Table 3 show that the two liquidity measures predicts stock 
returns over the 12 month period. The least liquid decile earns the highest return in comparison 
with what the most liquid decile earns. This is consistent with the intuition that higher risk comes 
with higher return and further shows that liquidity is an important source of priced risk.  
The results from Table 3 further show that the least liquid portfolio outperforms the market (i.e., 
OSEBX) in terms of annual average returns over the sample period, except for four years. 
Meanwhile, the market earns higher returns than the most liquid portfolio on average every year 
except for one. This one exception is seen when comparing the mean  return of the market and 
that of the most liquid portfolio (see Table 3, Panel A). Similarly, Panel B of Table 3 indicates 
that the annual average returns of the market outperforms the annual average returns of the most 
liquid portfolio over the sample period, except for one year. The lowest–highest returns has been 
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found to be relatively high in comparison to the market over the sample period, except for five 
and four years by applying the Alpha and CS estimators respectively (see Panels A and B of 
Table 3). We find that the return volatility of the lowest–highest portfolios is relatively low in 
comparison to the market for both estimators.  
Table 3: Results of annual returns for each group of liquidity as well as OSEBX 
Year  Least                 2             3                   4             Most         Lowest -        OSEBX 
   liquid                  liquid         Highest 
Sample period January 2000 – January 2011 
Panel A: Mean returns and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of liquidity sorted portfolios as 
   well as OSEBX by applying Alpha estimator 
2000     -0.01              -0.13             -0.06            -0.02          -0.02               0.03               0.01 
            (5.90)             (4.73)           (4.84)     (4.97)  (4.62)           (0.08)             (1.26) 
2001     -0.29             -0.39             -0.17      -0.10 -0.17               0.03                -0.13 
            (7.16)            (6.37)          (6.44)     (6.29) (5.73)           (0.80)             (1.39) 
2002     0.07               0.03         0.14     0.10    0.16               0.03             0.13 
 (6.89)            (5.92)          (6.13)   (7.20)  (6.69)           (0.08)               (1.10) 
2003   0.21             0.15         0.09            0.15    0.08               0.02                0.13 
 (3.36)            (2.60)            (2.87)      (3.87) (3.60)            (0.08)             (0.84) 
2004   0.21             0.09             0.06    0.07              0.05                0.03               0.11 
 (3.46)           (2.90)          (2.80)   (3.13)  (3.09)            (0.08)          (1.46) 
2005  0.02            -0.08              -0.23   -0.09             -0.12               0.04               -0.04 
 (3.95)           (3.28)            (3.63)   (3.47)  (4.49)             (0.08)            (1.53) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Year  Least                 2             3                   4             Most         Lowest -        OSEBX 
   liquid                  liquid         Highest 
2006  -0.20            -0.15             -0.22      -0.10   -0.11              0.04          -0.04 
 (8.17)           (6.72)            (7.57)         (7.10) (5.71)             (0.08)             (3.00) 
2007  0.17           0.02        -0.10      -0.07  -0.10     0.03                0.06 
 (5.11)           (4.64)           (4.23)      (5.45)  (3.31)            (0.08)             (1.35) 
2008  0.06              0.01            -0.07               -0.08             -0.25              0.03                0.01 
 (6.10)           (4.27)           (5.09)     (6.19)     (3.96)            (0.08)              (1.54) 
2009  0.24              0.11       -0.01               0.02  -0.06               0.03                 0.09 
 (5.25)          (3.42)            (3.51)             (5.28)  (3.00)            (0.08)              (6.97) 
2010  0.03             0.01             -0.14     -0.15  -0.19               0.03                 0.00 
 (5.09)          (3.45)            (3.61)     (5.09)  (4.43)            (0.08)               (1.10) 
2011  0.07            -0.09             -0.24              -0.11     -0.33                0.01                 -0.10 
 (5.28)          (3.17)            (3.62)    (6.34) (4.63)              (0.16)               (1.17) 
Panel B: Mean returns and standard deviation (in parenthesis) of liquidity sorted portfolios as 
   well as OSEBX by applying CS estimator 
2000   0.27           -0.09               -0.18            -0.11           -0.10                   0.07                0.01 
 (7.01)         (4.01)              (4.29)    (4.72)          (4.51)                 (0.14)             (1.26) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Year  Least                 2             3                   4             Most         Lowest -        OSEBX 
   liquid                  liquid         Highest 
2001   -0.23            -0.24            -0.23             -0.27      -0.15              0.07               -0.13 
  (7.90)            (5.23)          (6.13)      (6.47)  (5.94)           (0.14)              (1.39) 
2002      0.52              0.04            -0.03      -0.12            0.06               0.07                0.13 
 (7.54)            (4.67)           (5.90)     (6.79) (7.54)            (0.14)              (1.10) 
2003  0.67               0.06            -0.02              -0.05 -0.02               0.07                0.13 
 (4.33)            (2.22)           (2.52)     (3.15) (3.67)            (0.14)             (0.84) 
2004  0.51              0.02         0.01             -0.01 -0.03               0.07                0.11 
 (4.45)           (2.35)            (2.46)     (2.77) (2.94)            (0.13)              (1.46) 
2005  0.04             -0.12             -0.18              -0.13       -0.11             0.08                 -0.04 
 (5.16)           (2.85)            (2.94)     (3.17)  (4.37)            (0.13)              (1.53) 
2006  0.11            -0.30             -0.24             -0.18              -0.15              0.08                 -0.04 
          (10.19)          (5.71)            (6.26)            (6.75)      (5.54)            (0.13)               (3.00) 
2007  0.26             0.02      -0.17    -0.12              -0.08              0.08                  0.06 
 (6.72)          (3.48)            (4.11)    (4.33)  (3.41)            (0.13)               (1.35) 
2008 0.11            -0.06             -0.17              -0.26             -0.08               0.08                  0.01 
 (7.17)        (3.67)             (4.73)   (5.28)            (4.20)            (0.14)                (1.54) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
Year  Least                 2             3                   4             Most         Lowest -        OSEBX 
   liquid                  liquid         Highest 
2009    0.42              0.07              -0.06            -0.11     -0.05               0.08                0.09 
   (6.72)           (2.67)            (3.19)           (3.82)         (3.05)             (0.14)             (0.70) 
2010    0.08            -0.11              -0.16            -0.22            0.09               0.07                0.00 
              (6.67)          (3.05)          (3.33)      (4.34)          (3.74)            (0.14)             (1.10) 
2011   -0.27            0.00         -0.06      -0.28  -0.14               0.04               -0.10 
              (7.12)          (3.59)             (3.75)      (4.34)  (4.06)             (0.13)             (1.17) 
 
4.1.2 The performance of decile portfolios, after controlling for firm size on an nnual basis 
Table 4 presents the performance of decile portfolios after controlling for firm size in 
comparison to the market. The previous section documented a significant liquidity premium by 
applying the two liquidity measures: the Alpha and CS estimators. We constructed two extreme 
portfolios for the two liquidity measures and controlled for the firm sizes. These extreme 
portfolios were further sorted into least liquid portfolio given large and small firm sizes as well 
as most liquid portfolio given large and small firm sizes. This was done so we can compare large 
and small firms for the same liquidity decile. We find that the least liquid portfolio given large 
firm size earns relatively higher returns every year (except for two years by the applying Alpha 
estimator)  than that earned by small firms of the same liquidity decile for both estimators. 
Similarly, the large firms outperform the small firms for the most liquid portfolio every year by 
applying both estimators  (see Panels A and B of Table 4). The liquidity measures applied in this 
thesis demonstrate the same pattern of performance of the extreme decile portfolios controlling 
for firm size. The results, however, may imply that the large firms have a bigger exposure than 
the small firms as the large firms form a greater part of the market and the economy. The results, 
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here is not consistent with the so-called small-firm effect which argues that the stocks of smaller 
firms tend to outperform the stocks of large firms.  
Panel A of Table 4 shows that the least liquid portfolio given small firm size outperforms most 
liquid portfolio given small firm size on average annually over the entire sample period, except 
for four and three years by applying the alpha and CS estimators respectively. The results further 
show that, the least liquid portfolio given large firm size earns higher returns on average every 
year with the exception of five and two years by applying the alpha and CS estimators 
respectively. This is relative to that earned by  the most liquid portfolio given large firm size (see 
Panel B of Table 4). Additionally, the market earns relatively high average returns every year, 
except for three years  than the stocks of small firms for the lowest liquidity decile by applying 
both estimators. We also find that the market outperforms the stocks of small firms for the 
highest liquidity decile on an annual basis (see Panel A of Table 4). The results further show that 
the stocks of large firms for the least liquid decile outperform the market on a yearly basis by 
applying the CS estimator (but with the exception of one year by applying the Alpha estimator). 
The market outperforms the stocks of large firms for the most liquid decile on average every 
year, except for two years by applying the CS estimator. Meanwhile, the stocks of large firms for 
the most liquid decile underperforms the market on average in six years as well as outperforms 
the market on average in six years by applying the Alpha estimator (see Panel B of Table 4).  
Table 4: Results of average returns every year for the least liquid and most liquid porfolios 
   given firm size in comparison with the market 
Year  Least liquid portfolio   Most liquid portfolio  Market index  
  given small firms   given small firms 
 Alpha         CS         Alpha      CS       (OSEBX)  
Sample period January 2000 – January 2011 
Panel A: Average returns for liquidity groups given small firm size by applying both estimators 
2000    -0.39       -0.21      -0.19     -0.35         0.01 
2001    -0.66           -0.65      -0.21     -0.59        -0.13 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Year  Least liquid portfolio   Most liquid portfolio  Market index  
  given small firms   given small firms 
Alpha         CS        Alpha      CS       (OSEBX)  
2002  -0.78        0.04     -0.41      -0.57        0.13 
2003   0.12       0.41     -0.10      -0.30        0.13 
2004  0.20       0.29     -0.08        -0.19        0.11 
2005  -0.22      -0.41                -0.25      -0.07       -0.04 
2006  -0.66      -0.45     -0.39      -0.65       -0.04 
2007  0.08                -0.18      -0.25      -0.38        0.06 
2008  -0.16     -0.30      -0.82         -0.58          0.01 
2009   0.31      0.10      -0.38        -0.26                    0.09 
2010  -0.04     -0.32      -0.634    -0.523                  0.00 
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Table 4 (continued) 
Year  Least liquid portfolio   Most liquid portfolio  Market index  
  given large firms   given large firms 
Alpha         CS        Alpha      CS       (OSEBX)  
Panel B: Average returns for liquidity groups given large firm size by applying both estimators 
2000   0.05       0.46      0.01      -0.04          0.01 
2001            -0.13        -0.10     -0.10         -0.05         -0.13 
2002   0.17        0.42      0.20          0.06             0.13 
2003   0.18      0.61       0.24     -0.02                     0.13 
2004  0.23      0.72       0.12     -0.02            0.11 
2005  0.09      0.45                 -0.06       -0.07           -0.04 
2006  0.09      0.83                 -0.04        -0.11         -0.04 
2007  0.07                0.63                             0.04         -0.03         0.06 
2008  0.10       0.40                 -0.01         -0.05         0.01 
2009  0.09      0.57                  0.12          0.00          0.09 
2010  -0.01      0.23                 -0.00      -0.04         0.00 
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4.1.3 The performance of decile portfolios, after controlling for firm size on a monthly basis 
As stated earlier, we sorted the stocks into least and most liquid given firm size. Table 5 shows 
the average returns on a monthly basis over the defined period for the extreme portfolios: the 
least and most liquid stocks given small and large firm sizes. 
Panel A of table 5 shows that the least liquid stocks given small firm size mostly outperform the 
most liquid stocks given large firm size except for two and three months when Alpha and CS are 
applied respectively. The results further indicate that the market earns relatively higher returns 
than both least and most liquid stocks given small firm size on average every month over the 
defined sample period. There is an exception for the least liquid stocks given small firm size 
where the market underperforms against such stocks for two and three months when Alpha and 
CS are applied respectively. Similarly, the least liquid stocks given large firm size outperform 
the most liquid stocks of the same firm size for both estimators (see Pane B of Table 5). 
However, the least liquid stocks given large firm size outperform the market on average every 
month for both estimators, except for two months when the Alpha estimator is applied. On the 
contrary, the most liquid stocks of the same firm size mostly underperform against the market on 
average every month for both estimators. The results clearly show that the least liquid stocks of 
both firm sizes outperforms the most liquid stocks given same firm size (see Panels A and B of 
Table 5). This implies that the least liquid stocks have relatively higher risk than the most liquid 
stocks given the same firm size and thus, require high returns as compensation. This is consistent 
with the intuition that higher risk comes with higher returns. Small firms are usually considered 
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Table 5: Results of average returns every month for the least liquid and most liquid 
   porfolios given firm size in comparison with the market 
Month  Least liquid portfolio   Most liquid portfolio  Market index  
  given small firms   given small firms 
Alpha         CS        Alpha      CS       (OSEBX)  
Sample period January 2000 – January 2011 
Panel A: Average returns for liquidity groups given small firm size by applying both estimators 
January -0.68     -0.64       -0.28    -0.46                  -0.16  
February -0.13     -0.27       -0.48    -0.49               -0.06 
March  -0.49     -0.36       -0.62    -0.46                  -0.06 
April   0.11      0.05       -0.31    -0.10                 0.15 
May  -0.14                 0.18       -0.27    -0.67            0.13 
June  0.05    -0.19       -0.29    -0.05                    0.21 
July  -0.23     0.02                  -0.65    -0.46           -0.04 
August  -0.16    -0.18       -0.39    -0.40                  0.01 
September -0.25    -0.05       -0.25    -0.18                     0.11 
October -0.06     0.16       -0.26    -0.40                    0.06 
November -0.23    -0.23       -0.39    -0.48                     0.00 
December -0.12    -0.40       -0.35    -0.28                     0.00 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Month  Least liquid portfolio   Most liquid portfolio  Market index  
  given large firms   given large firms 
Alpha         CS        Alpha      CS       (OSEBX)  
Panel B: Average returns for liquidity groups given large firm size by applying both estimators 
January -0.11        0.15      -0.25    -0.22                -0.16  
February -0.02        0.43      -0.05    -0.14                 -0.06 
March  -0.06        0.06      -0.04    -0.05                -0.06 
April   0.34        0.86       0.05     0.04                   0.15 
May  0.25        0.72       0.11     0.03                  0.13 
June  0.26        0.91       0.20     0.06               0.21 
July  0.07        0.35      -0.52    -0.08                 -0.04 
August           -0.06        0.19      -0.02    -0.06                   0.01 
September      0.15        0.64        0.14    0.01             0.11 
October 0.10        0.63        0.03   -0.03                0.06 
November 0.02       0.31       -0.03   -0.08                   0.00 
December 0.08       0.43       -0.02   -0.05                  0.00 
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4.1.4 Descriptive statistics of the least and most liquid portfolios 
Table 6 represents the descriptive statistics of the least and most liquid portfolios as well as the 
difference between the two extreme portfolios. Table 6 shows the comparison of both estimators, 
Alpha and CS over the sample period from January 2000 through January 2011. For the least 
liquid portfolio, the mean return is relatively lower using the Alpha estimator as compared to 
using to using the CS estimator. The return volatility is smaller for the Alpha estimator as 
compared to the CS estimator. On the contrary, the mean return of the most liquid portfolio is 
relatively higher using the Alpha estimator as compared to using the CS estimator. Meanwhile, 
the return volatility is relatively lower for the Alpha estimator relative to the CS estimator. The 
difference in average  returns and return volatility are relatively smaller for the Alpha estimator 
in comparison to the CS estimator. 
As shown in Table 6, the mean return of the least liquid portfolio is higher than the mean return 
of the most liquid portfolio with an excess return on average of 0.03% by applying the Alpha 
estimator. Similarly,  the least liquid portfolio earns returns on average than the most liquid 
portfolio with an excess return on average of 0.07% by applying the CS estimator. The risk as 
measured by the deviation is higher for the least liquid portfolio relative to the most liquid 
portfolio by applying both estimators. 
Table 6 further indicates that the maximum and minimum average returns are relatively higher 
for the least liquid portfolio than the most liquid portfolio. For the least liquid portfolio, the 
minimum and maximum  average returns are both smaller when the Alpha estimator is applied; 
as compared to applying the CS estimator. Meanwhile, for the most liquid portfolio, the 
minimum average return is smaller. However, the maximum average return is larger for the 
Alpha estimator as compared to the CS estimator. The return volatility for both the least liquid 
and most liquid portfolios are smaller by applying Alpha estimator as compared to CS estimator. 
This implies that the risk as measured by the standard deviation is relatively higher for the CS 
estimator over the Alpha estimator.  
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Table 6: Results of average returns of least liquid and most liquid portfolios as well their 
   difference 
  Least liquid portfolio    Most liquid portfolio     Difference  
Alpha  CS    Alpha CS  Alpha  CS 
Sample period January 2000 – January 2011 
Mean return 0.01   0.05     -0.02 -0.03       0.03  0.07 
Std. Dev.  0.06      0.13       0.06 0.06     0.08          0.14 
Min  -0.23              -0.10    -0.23            -0.25    -0.23            -0.10 
Max  0.24                0.52     0.04  0.03     0.24  0.52 
 
4.15 The performance of the least and most liquid stocks on a yearly basis 
Table 7 represents the annual average returns and standard deviations of the least liquid and most 
liquid portfolios as well as the difference between them for both Alpha and CS estimators over 
the sample period. Panel A of Table 7 shows that the least liquid stocks earn higher average 
returns than the most liquid stocks every year over the sample period. Similarly, the least liquid 
stocks outperform the most liquid stocks in terms of  average returns every year over the sample 
period (see Panel B of Table 7). The results show that the returns of the least liquid stocks are, on 
average 0.03% and 0.07% higher per year than the most liquid portfolio for Alpha and CS 
estimators respectively. Thus, both portfolios have similar annual average returns. The results 
further indicate that the average return difference between the least liquid and the most liquid 
portfolios are positive for every year over the sample period from January 2000 through January 
2011. However, the return volatility is higher for the least liquid portfolio relative to the most 
liquid portfolio every year except for three years  when the Alpha estimator is applied. The same 
pattern is seen, but the exception is for one year when the CS estimator is applied. The results 
show that the return volatility is relatively higher when the CS estimator is applied than when the 
Alpha estimator is applied. 
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Table 7: Results of average returns of low-liquid and high-liquid portfolios as well their 
   difference for each year 
Year   Least liquid portfolio           Most liquid portfolio     Difference 
  Mean       Std. Dev              Mean       Std. Dev   Mean     Std. Dev 
Sample period January 2000 – January 2011 
Panel A: Average returns of low-liquid and high-liquid portfolios as well their difference for 
  each year by applying Alpha estimator 
2000  0.01       0.06   -0.02        0.05   0.03          0.08 
2001  0.01      0.06   -0.02        0.06   0.03         0.08 
2002  0.01       0.07   -0.02         0.05   0.03         0.08 
2003  0.01       0.06   -0.01         0.04   0.02         0.08 
2004  0.01        0.06    -0.02         0.05   0.03         0.08 
2005  0.01       0.06    -0.03         0.06   0.04         0.08 
2006  0.01         0.06   -0.03          0.06   0.04         0.08 
2007  0.01         0.06   -0.03          0.06   0.03         0.08 
2008  0.01         0.06   -0.02          0.06   0.03         0.08 
2009  0.01         0.06   -0.02          0.06   0.03         0.08 
2010  0.01         0.06   -0.02          0.05   0.03         0.08 
2011  -0.05        0.09   -0.06          0.10   0.01         0.16 
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Table 7 (continued) 
Year   Least liquid portfolio           Most liquid portfolio     Difference 
  Mean       Std. Dev              Mean       Std. Dev   Mean     Std. Dev 
Panel B: Average returns of low-liquid and high-liquid portfolios as well their difference for 
  each year by applying CS estimator 
2000  0.05         0.13  -0.03          0.06  0.07         0.14 
2001  0.05          0.13  -0.02          0.06  0.07        0.14 
2002  0.06         0.14  -0.02          0.05  0.07        0.14 
2003  0.05        0.14  -0.02          0.05  0.07        0.14 
2004  0.05        0.13  -0.03          0.06  0.07        0.13 
2005  0.04        0.13  -0.03          0.06  0.08        0.13 
2006  0.04        0.13  -0.03          0.07  0.08          0.13 
2007  0.05        0.13  -0.03           0.06  0.08          0.13 
2008  0.05       0.13  -0.03          0.06  0.08          0.14 
2009  0.05        0.14  -0.03         0.06  0.08          0.14 
2010  0.05        0.14  -0.02           0.06  0.07          0.14 
2011           -0.02       0.04  -0.06          0.11  0.04        0.13 
 
The Figures 4-10 illustrate the time-series of daily returns for the different portfolios constructed 
as well as for OSEBX over the defined sample period. We noticed a straight line in Figure 10 
and found that the returns are not up to the threshold that is why there is such straight line in the 
plot in 2003. The Figures 11-12 illustrates the histogram of the Alpha and CS spreads. 
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Figure 4: The figure illustrates a time-series of daily returns for OSEBX spreads over the sample 
period from January 2000 through January 2011. OSEBX has an average return of 0.029%, with 




Figure 5: The figure illustrates a time-series of daily returns for the least liquid portfolio over the 
sample period from January 2000 through January 2011. The lowest liquid stocks have a return 
of 0.048% on average, with a volatility of 2.06% over the sample period. 
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Figure 6: The figure illustrates a time-series of daily returns for the most liquid stocks over the 
sample period from January 2000 through January 2011. The most liquid portfolio has an 




Figure 7: The figure illustrates a time-series of daily returns for the least liquid portfolio given 
small firm size over the sample period from January 2000 through January 2011. The lowest 
liquid stocks given small firm size has an average return of -0.163%, with a volatility of 159.7% 
over the sample period. 
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Figure 8: The figure illustrates a time-series of daily returns for the least liquid portfolio given 
large firm size over the sample period from January 2000 through January 2011. The lowest 
liquid stocks given large firm size has an average return of 0.472%, with a volatility of 94% over 
the sample period. 
 
 
Figure 9: The figure illustrates a time-series of annual returns for the most liquid portfolio given 
small firm size over the sample period from January 2000 through January 2011. The most liquid 
stocks given small firm size has an average return of -0.407%, with a volatility of 120.4% over 
the sample period. 
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Figure 10: The figure illustrates a time-series of daily returns for the most liquid portfolio given 
large firm size over the sample period from January 2000 through January 2011. The most liquid 
stocks given large firm size has an average return of -0.049%, with a volatility of 52.56% over 




Figure 11: The figure illustrates the histogram of the Alpha spreads. The mean spread is 
0.0077351 or 0.77% with a Standard deviation of 0.021437 with a maximum spread of 2.014903 
and minimum of -0.718155. 




Figure 12: The figure illustrates the histogram of the CS spreads. The mean spread is -0.010014 
or -1.0014% with a Standard deviation of 0.0582307 with a maximum spread of 0.6931472 and 

















 52 | P a g e  
 
CHAPTER FIVE  
CONCLUSION 
5.1 Conclusion 
Using the two innovative measures of liquidity for individual Norwegian stocks, namely, the 
Alpha and CS estimators, we show that least liquid stocks tend to be small, low-priced and less 
traded with wide bid-ask spreads and higher returns which is consistent with the intuition 
properties of illiquid stocks. Based on the two liquidity measures, this thesis documents a 
significant liquidity premium over the sample period from January 2000 through January 2011. 
We find that the average returns of least liquid stocks are higher than the average returns of most 
liquid stocks using both estimators, consistent with the intuition that higher return comes with 
higher risk. 
The empirical results of individual stocks listed on the Norwegian stock exchange and of the 
market clearly indicate that liquidity is a time-varying risk factor. The two measures of aggregate 
liquidity capture market liquidity conditions and fluctuations in aggregate liquidity generally 
correspond to market movements as expected. The results obtained show that returns on the 
lowest liquid stocks are, on average higher per year and per month than the most liquid stocks. 
We find that the portfolio, which comprises of stocks with wide bid-ask spread, has on average 
higher returns than all other portfolios. We noticed that the least liquid portfolio outperforms the 
most liquid portfolio, an indication of the presence of liquidity premium for t Norwegian stock 
over the defined sample period. This implies that, liquidity is an important source of priced risk. 
We further find that the stocks of  large firms earn relatively higher returns on average every 
year than the stocks of small firms for both the least and most liquid deciles. The results obtained 
show that the stocks of both large and small firms for the least liquid decile outperform the 
stocks of large and small firms for the most liquid decile respectively. The results indicate that 
the market outperforms the stocks of small firms for both the least and most liquid deciles on an 
annual basis. Meanwhile, the stocks of large firms for the least liquid decile outperform the 
market on a yearly basis. We also find that the market outperforms the stocks of large firms for 
the most liquid decile on average by applying the CS estimator but none performs better than the 
other by applying the Alpha estimator.  
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The empirical results reveal that the returns of the least liquid stocks are, on average 0.03% and 
0.07% higher per year than the most liquid stocks for Alpha and CS estimators, respectively. We 
find that the average return difference between the least liquid and the most liquid stocks are 
positive every year over the sample period from January 2000 through January 2011. The lowest 
liquid stocks therefore outperform the most liquid stocks as well as the overall market on a 
yearly and a monthly basis while the market earns higher than the most liquid stocks.  
The findings of this thesis indicate that the volatility of liquidity (i.e., spread) is higher for the 
average liquidity of Norwegian stocks as well as the overall market by applying CS estimator as 
compared to applying Alpha estimator. Moreover, the volatility of excess returns is higher by 
applying CS estimator than applying Alpha estimator. We find that return  volatility is higher for 
the least liquid stocks relative to the most liquid stocks by applying both Alpha and CS 
estimators. The results also show that the volatility of returns in general is higher for the CS 
estimator relative to the Alpha estimator.  
The empirical findings of this thesis are consistent with the underpinning asset pricing argument 
that stock prices reflect a premium that investors demand for holding illiquid stocks. Amimud 
and Mendelson (1986) show empirical evidence of such a premium for the bid-ask spread 
measure of liquidity. Existing literature on liquidity and asset pricing demonstrates the 
following: average liquidity cost and risk are priced; liquidity improves market efficiency; and 
liquidity strengthens the arbitrage connection between related markets. We expect that the 
findings of this thesis would serve as a basis for further research on liquidity and asset pricing. 
We therefore suggest for continued research on liquidity and asset pricing, in particular asset 
allocation which includes portfolio construction to check risk and returns based on some 
economic insight and factor models which include size, value, momentum, liquidity and the 
likes. It would also be important to include more innovative liquidity measures. Other research 
areas may include the time variation in liquidity premium to find out what the premium depend 
on as well as their movement during high and low price volatility periods. 
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